Wolverton: A Life in Twilight
From Scienticity
(New page: {{BNR-table|scienticity=5|readability=5|hermeneutics=5|charisma=5|recommendation=5}} Mark Wolverton, ''A Life in Twilight : The Final Years of J. Robert Oppenheimer''. New York : St. Marti...) |
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Those mushroom clouds ended what seems sometimes like Act I of the life of Oppenheimer. Act II was certainly different, definitely eventful, but less rarely covered in biographical treatments, perhaps because the story seems less cohesive, and because it was not the triumphant story of Act I. The life of JRO (as he always seems to be abbreviated) in Act II is the subject of Mark Wolverton's book, and it's an excellent treatment. | Those mushroom clouds ended what seems sometimes like Act I of the life of Oppenheimer. Act II was certainly different, definitely eventful, but less rarely covered in biographical treatments, perhaps because the story seems less cohesive, and because it was not the triumphant story of Act I. The life of JRO (as he always seems to be abbreviated) in Act II is the subject of Mark Wolverton's book, and it's an excellent treatment. | ||
| - | This is a story of political machinations to rival any political thriller a novelist could dream up, and JRO strikes one as a classically tragic figure. The seeds of trouble were sown at least as far back as the Los Alamos | + | This is a story of political machinations to rival any political thriller a novelist could dream up, and JRO strikes one as a classically tragic figure. The seeds of trouble were sown at least as far back as the Los Alamos days and the problems JRO had with Edward Teller, who had an obsession with developing a hydrogen, or thermo-nuclear, bomb, which he always called the "super". Oppenheimer didn't stroke Teller's ego enough, so Teller became a bitter enemy. JRO seemed to think that a "super" was not so important, because atomic bombs were already enough to destroy civilization, so he didn't obsess about a "super" along with Teller. |
When the Soviets exploded their first atomic bomb years sooner than America expected, in 1953, some people in the Eisenhower Administration were looking for someone to blame. McCarthy's House Un-American Activities Committee had been in operation for some time, and Edward Teller was in a strong position as an advisor to President Eisenhower. Teller was able to convince presidential advisor and head of the Atomic Energy Commission (Eisenhower's appointee), Lewis Strauss, that what the US needed was a crash program to build a super. Soon the notion developed that the US had fallen '''behind''' the Soviets because of Oppenheimer's "opposition" to the super. | When the Soviets exploded their first atomic bomb years sooner than America expected, in 1953, some people in the Eisenhower Administration were looking for someone to blame. McCarthy's House Un-American Activities Committee had been in operation for some time, and Edward Teller was in a strong position as an advisor to President Eisenhower. Teller was able to convince presidential advisor and head of the Atomic Energy Commission (Eisenhower's appointee), Lewis Strauss, that what the US needed was a crash program to build a super. Soon the notion developed that the US had fallen '''behind''' the Soviets because of Oppenheimer's "opposition" to the super. | ||
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Eisenhower was convinced to revoke Oppenheimer's security clearance. Strauss, who was said to be personally motivated by an embarrassment at JRO's hands some years earlier during congressional hearings, arranged a "hearing" by the AEC on the question of JRO's security clearance. It was a scandalous kangaroo court that concluded that, while Oppenheimer was definitely "loyal" to the United States, he nevertheless was a "security risk". | Eisenhower was convinced to revoke Oppenheimer's security clearance. Strauss, who was said to be personally motivated by an embarrassment at JRO's hands some years earlier during congressional hearings, arranged a "hearing" by the AEC on the question of JRO's security clearance. It was a scandalous kangaroo court that concluded that, while Oppenheimer was definitely "loyal" to the United States, he nevertheless was a "security risk". | ||
| - | Oppenheimer at this time was one of the nation's most recognized | + | Oppenheimer at this time was one of the nation's most recognized celebrities. The case was a sensation and Americans ever after lined up either on the side that held that the hearing was a sham and Oppenheimer was a martyr to McCarthyism, or that it was a suitable come-uppance for an untrustworthy egg-head with communist sympathies. |
That's more or less where Wolverton picks up the threads of Oppenheimer's life. JRO is by that time Director of the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, NJ, the organization largely created to provide a place for Einstein to work. Oppenheimer held this position until his death in 1966. Ironically, Lewis Strauss was on the Board of Directors for most of that time, just to make things tense. (Strauss, in 1959, was humiliatingly rejected by the Senate as nominee to head the Department of Commerce; perjury was involved. This is thought to have been retribution for his treatment of Oppenheimer.) | That's more or less where Wolverton picks up the threads of Oppenheimer's life. JRO is by that time Director of the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, NJ, the organization largely created to provide a place for Einstein to work. Oppenheimer held this position until his death in 1966. Ironically, Lewis Strauss was on the Board of Directors for most of that time, just to make things tense. (Strauss, in 1959, was humiliatingly rejected by the Senate as nominee to head the Department of Commerce; perjury was involved. This is thought to have been retribution for his treatment of Oppenheimer.) | ||
